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WILLIAM G. SAYWELL* 
ABSTRACT 
Policies in Chinese education, particularly higher education, have undergone major shifts 
since 1949 in response to general swings in Chinese policy, ideological debates and the 
political fortunes of different leaders and factions. These changes have involved shifts in 
emphasis between "redness"and "expertness", between education as a party device designed 
to inculcate and sustain revolutionary values and education as a governmental instrument 
used to promote modernization. In the most recent period since Mao's death and the 
"Gang of Four's" ouster in the fall of 1976, there has been a return to pragmatism with the 
radical policies and stress on political goals of the Cultural Revolution period giving way to 
a renewed emphasis on developing professional and technical skills. These objectives are 
being promoted by the reintroduction of earlier moderate policies governing curricula, 
admission standards and academic administration and by extraordinary measures, including 
international educational exchanges, designed to overcome the Cultural Revolution's 
disruptive impact. These new policies have provoked some criticism from those concerned 
about elitist aspects of the current system and a reduced commitment to socialist values. 
Since educational policy is highly sensitive to shifting political currents, future changes in 
this area will serve as a barometer of new political trends. 
RÉSUMÉ 
La politique de l'enseignement en Chine, particulièrement l'enseignement supérieur, a subi 
des changements majeurs depuis 1949 en réponse aux va-et-vient généraux de la politique 
chinoise, aux débats idéologiques et à la fortune politique des différents leaders et des 
dissensions. Ces changements ont impliqués des déplacements d'accent entre le fait d'être 
"rouge" et le fait d'être "expert", entre l'éducation en tant qu'appareil d'un parti visant à 
inculquer et supporter des valeurs révolutionnaires et une éducation en tant qu 'instrument 
du gouvernement employé à promouvoir la modernisation. Dans la plus récente période 
depuis la mort de Mao et l'éviction du "Gang des Quatre" en automne 1976, il y a eu un 
retour au pragmatisme avec la politique radicale et un accent mis sur les buts politiques 
de la période de la Révolution Culturelle cédant la place à une importance renouvelée 
accordée au développement des aptitudes professionelles et techniques. Ces objectifs sont 
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promus par la réintroduction d'une politique modérée, plus ancienne, régissant les curri-
culums, les standards d'admission et l'administration académique, et par mesures extra-
ordinaires, incluant des échanges éducatifs internationaux, visant à surmonter l'impact 
perturbateur de la Révolution Culturelle. Cette nouvelle politique a provoqué quelques 
critiques dans les parties concernées par les aspects élitistes du système actuel et d'un senti-
ment de responsabilité réduit vis-à-vis des valeurs socialistes. Puisque la politique éducative 
est extrêmement sensible aux changements de courants politiques, les changements futurs 
dans ce domaine serviront de baromètre dans les nouvelles tendances politiques. 
Introduction: Shifts in Education Policies, 1949-1976 
Policies in Chinese education, particularly higher education, have undergone major 
periodic shifts since the establishment of the People's Republic of China in October, 1949. 
Few other major policy areas have been as sensitive to the general swings in Chinese 
policy, ideological debates and the political fortunes of different leaders and factions. 
This is hardly surprising. As a developing nation the critical importance education plays 
as a steering force in the nation's development is obvious. As a revolutionary socialist 
society its leaders have strongly held convictions about the values and norms, as well as 
the professional training, education must provide. Education is an explicit device of the 
party designed to inculcate and sustain revolutionary values and Marxist-Leninist theories, 
as well as an instrument of the state used to promote its modernization. The duality of 
'redness' and 'expertness' has been at the essence of Chinese educational objectives, while 
swings in emphasis between the two have been a major characteristic of policy change. 
As a controlled society (some would argue totalitarian), leaders and leadership groups 
have been able to impose sudden and dramatic shifts and reversals in the field of education 
policy as in other areas. 
In the early 1950's Chinese policies, including those in Chinese education, particularly 
at the post-secondary level, essentially followed the Soviet model. This emphasized 
scientific and technological training directed at the needs of an industrializing society. 
For example, in 1949 China had 180 institutions of higher education enrolling 80,000 
students. By 1957 enrollment had jumped to 440,000.' The Chinese Academcy of 
Sciences, the national organization primarily responsible for the training of research 
scientists, had thirty-one research institutes in 1952 and 170 in 1958.2 
When Mao abandoned much of the Soviet model in the Great Leap Forward of 1958, 
policies in education shifted accordingly. Less priority was given to the advanced training 
of a scientific and technological group needed to manage an industrializing economy. 
Politics and class background were introduced as criteria for admission to university. 
Priority was given programmes which aimed at achieving mass literacy, providing local 
initiative, expanding rural educational opportunities, encouraging curricular and structural 
innovation and politicizing education at all levels. Many of these policies including pro-
grammes like the part-work/part-study schemes had their roots in the Chinese Communists' 
revolutionary tradition long before Liberation and had been continued in the early 1950's. 
But they were given renewed priority in the great Leap period. Enrollment in China's 
primary schools almost doubled between 1957 and 1965, jumping from 51,000,000 in 
1952 to 64,000,000 in 1957 and 116,000,000 in 1965,3 This represented 84.7% of 
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school age children.4 In the same period middle (secondary) school enrollment increased 
from 3,100,000 to 7,000,000 in 1957 and 14,400,000 in 1965.5 The failure of the 
Great Leap generally and the economic difficulties that followed led to a retreat in these 
educational priorities along with a major shift in the country's economic policies as a 
whole. As China moved to a more moderate set of policies in the recovery years of the 
early 1960's, education policies began to shift their emphasis away from the more poli-
tically oriented ones of the Leap years to those associated with economic development. 
While mass literacy and universal primary education remained important targets, a renewed 
emphasis was given higher education, particularly in the training of scientists and engineers 
in both universities and research institutes. By 1965 university enrollment had reached 
670,000.6 
Community run primary and middle schools offered at least some education to most 
at the local level. But academic quality and opportunities for professional development 
and mobility rested in a state run system which included "key" schools at each level.7 
To the key schools went the best teachers, students and equipment. Unified entrance 
examinations channelled the best students from each level into the key institutions at 
the next level. Class background and political activism remained criteria for admission to 
universities, but the basic evaluation was made on the academic record of the student, 
particularly in the form of his or her mark on the college entrance exam. The quality of 
middle and primary schools was largely judged on the basis of the percentage of their 
students who entered college. At the top of the hierarchy China's best universities were 
designated "key" universities and made directly responsible to the Ministry of Education. 
In 1965 education in China, especially higher education, favored city over countryside, 
intellectual ability over class background or political activism and 'expert' over 'red'. 
To Mao Zedong these policies, like many at that time, were 'revisionist' and the work 
of 'capitalist roaders' in the party. China and especially its youth had to be redirected 
away from the revisionist model of the Soviet Union with whom China had fallen out 
in 1960, to a purer Chinese revolutionary one. In 1966 he launched the Great Proletarian 
Cultural Revolution. In June of that year university classes were suspended, initially for 
six months, to revise curricula, teaching methods and admission procedures. In the 
summar of 1967 a few institutes of higher education such as the Aeronautics Institute of 
Peking resumed limited work, but essentially China's system of higher education remained 
closed. In October, 1967 a central directive ordered universities, secondary and primary 
schools everywhere to commence classes immediately. Primary and middle schools which 
had also been widely suspended resumed classes at different points between then and 
1969. But China's universities remained torn by revolutionary upheaval. 
In July, 1968 a new directive from Mao published in the People's Daily explained what 
kind of higher education China should have: 
It is still necessary to have universities: here I refer mainly to colleges of 
science and engineering. However, it is essential to shorten the length of 
schooling, revolutionize education, put proletarian politics in command and 
take the road of the Shanghai Machine Tools Plant in training technicians from 
among the workers. Students should be selected from among the workers and 
peasants with practical experience, and they should return to production after 
a few years' study.8 
The report in which this directive appeared was vitally important, highlighting major points 
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that would serve as the guidelines for most institutions as they reopened. It emphasized 
the need for students to engage in productive labour before entering university, to combine 
study and labour, use workers in the classroom as teachers and place greater emphasis on 
class background and ideological purity as criteria for admission. It also pointed to the 
production unit as the crucial level at which recommendation of students wanting to enter 
university should take place. 
In August, 1968 "worker-peasant Mao Zedong propaganda teams" entered universities 
throughout the country. Under the combined pressure and direction of these teams 
comprised of local workers, and units of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) stationed 
in China's major universities, most institutions spent much of 1968 and 1969 struggling 
to re-establish order and prepare for the resumption of classes.9 Revolutionary com-
mittees replaced the decimated party and the purged administration as the political and 
administrative authority. Slowly China's universities, some in 1970 and others in 1971 
or 1972, resumed undergraduate education. 
For four or five years China had been without university education. Many young 
people who wanted to attend university simply lost the opportunity forever. China's 
professors and researchers had been denied access to libraries and laboratories. Many 
suffered horribly at the hands of Red Guard fanatics, while others spent long periods in 
manual labour and political study in the countryside. Some were killed or committed 
suicide. Library collections, laboratories and personal research materials were often 
damaged and sometimes destroyed. Except in a few select areas, usually of military 
significance, little serious research was done and no significant direct contact with the 
international scientific community and its publications maintained. While most of China's 
professors went back to the classroom between 1970 and 1973, the next few years until 
Mao's death in the autumn of 1976 were extremely frustrating. New education policies 
known collectively as the 'revolution in education' were strongly influenced by the 
radicals, in particular the "Gang of Four" led by Mao's wife Jiang Qing. At all levels 
these policies were designed to end the so called "three divorcements" or "separations" 
of earlier Chinese education from proletarian politics, manual labour and the workers 
and peasants. 
At the primary and middle school level the policies of the Cultural Revolution decade 
(1966-76) emphasized getting some education to everyone rather than better education 
to the best qualified. The six/six year primary/middle school period was reduced to a 
five/five year system. Entrance exams were abolished, curriculum condensed and simplified, 
practical training, manual labour, political study and activism stressed. Political reports 
replaced academic ones and failure was virtually unheard of. The key school system was 
dismantled; professionally well qualified teachers were often replaced with politically 
acceptable but academically unqualified teachers, frequently not themselves middle 
school graduates. There was wide experimentation with factory-run schools, 'on the spot' 
education and the use of workers and peasants for some classroom instruction. 
Although academic quality was sacrificed, some very real progress appears to have 
been made in achieving universal primary education in all but the most remote areas, 
and getting a higher percentage of the nation's youth, particularly from worker/peasant 
backgrounds into some area of secondary education. Schools were relocated at the basic 
production units, more schools were established, attendance rules were made more 
flexible especially in rural schools to correspond with the agricultural season, financial 
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aid was given poorer children and increased opportunities were created for 'irregular' or 
part-time study. Enrollment in middle schools almost quadrupled during the decade 
reaching 58,280,000 in 1977.10 
Changes in the primary and middle school system had a major impact on the universities. 
But specific new policies for higher education had an even more profound influence on the 
quality of university education in the Cultural Revolution decade.11 The first major change 
was the reduction in the length of programmes from the usual five years in science and 
engineering to four, and from four to three years in liberal arts. Students normally were 
not allowed to enter university directly from middle school, having first to be "tempered 
by labour" for at least two years in the nation's communes, factories or PLA.12 Admission 
was possible for students who had five years experience in "productive labour" even though 
they were not graduates of Senior Middle schools. 
In the early 1970's, university education in China characteristically involved a three 
year programme for a student body, most of whom had a junior middle school education, 
that is approximately a total of eight years of pre-university schooling, interrupted by 
several years work. Many of the students in medical programmes, the length of which had 
been cut from five to four and sometimes three years, had entered after some para-medical 
experience usually as bare-foot doctors in the countryside. Many of these students had only 
a primary or middle school education, and a few months of paramedical training before 
entering a university programme that typically included only a year of basic science 
study before the final two years of clinical and internship work. 
Perhaps the most dramatic changes were in the admission criteria and procedures. 
Provincial bureaus of education distributed the number of college places among counties 
and cities, which in turn, allocated them to the work units. "This was done with a view 
to making up particular deficiencies of skills in communes, factories, and other units, on 
the assumption that young people would return to the locality after graduation."13 
Entrance exams were abolished. The new admission system involved four stages: voluntary 
application, recommendation by the masses, approval by the leadership and re-evaluation 
by the university. At the second step candidates who had applied were considered by 
their fellow workers and a recommendation made to the leadership of the production unit 
in which all worked. These recommendations were screened by the leadership who forwarded 
their choice to the universities which made the final selection. The leadership stage allowed 
for considerable abuse of the system as cadres in communes and factories often chose their 
own relatives in a practice known as "using the back door". 
Three major criteria were used in the selection process: physical fitness, 'cultural 
level' (i.e. intellectual ability and academic achievement) and political consciousness. 
It was the third of these that was critical. In general it was much more than an evaluation 
of political activism or ideological sophistication. Essentially it was a kind of character 
reference in which the candidates' fellow workers were expected to judge them as citizens 
in terms of such things as their selflessness, interpersonal relations, leadership qualities, 
dedication, conscientiousness and so on. Only the sons and daughters of workers, peasants 
and soldiers could apply, although children of other urban groups were eligible by virtue 
of their two years of labour in the countryside allowing them to be reclassifed as peasants! 
Changes in the form and content of university education were also dramatic. Exams, 
or at least what were referred to as "surprise attack" exams, were abolished. Textbooks 
and other teaching materials were rewritten to incorporate the latest ideological position. 
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In all disciplines written materials and lectures were expected to take on a more applied 
or practical bent. A major emphasis was placed on political study and manual labour for 
both faculty and students. Universities had factories and workshops on their campuses 
and were associated with others off-campus.14 Practice varied greatly from university to 
university. In the period of most radical experimentation, 1974-76, large numbers of 
Beida (Peking University) and Qinghua University students spent much of the year off 
campus. For example, several hundred Beida freshmen spent the entire 1974-75 academic 
year at the university's farm. At Shanghai's Fudan University on the other hand, there 
appears to have been relatively little of this.15 
The impact of all these changes on educational standards was enormous and provoked 
an early response from at least one courageous academic leader, Beida's Chancellor, 
Zhou Beiyuan, who published an article in 1972, probably with the support of Premier 
Zhou Enlai, urging higher standards and more attention to basic theory, and criticizing 
excessive practical work and the substitution of workshop labour for laboratory experi-
ments.16 At Beida a short entrance examination which included Chinese, math, physics 
and chemistry, became part of the final stage of the admission process. In 1973 this 
"revisionist" trend accelerated and standardized exams were given that summer in many 
parts of the nation.17 
These and other moderating changes in some of China's best universities during 1973 
constituted a retreat from the revolution in education in the eyes of radicals and provoked 
their own counterattack.18 The moderating trends were called the "hui-ch'ao" or "reverse 
current" and the radical reaction to them which began in August, 1973 was called the 
"going-against-the-tide" campaign which later merged with the famous anti-Lin Biao, 
anti-Confucius campaign which heralded the Gang of Four's direct, if initially veiled, 
assult on Premier Zhou Enlai. 
On August 10,1973 the People's Daily published the soon-to-be famous letter of Chang 
Tiehsheng, a Liaoning province student who could not answer any of the questions on a 
college entrance exam. Chang submitted a blank paper accompanied by a letter arguing 
that it was unfair to send students to work in the countryside and then examine them as 
a condition of university admission. Chang's case brewed a national propaganda storm. 
The trend toward re-establishing the entrance exam as the basic means of evaluating 
students in the final university stage of the admission process was halted, although the use 
of exams was not entirely eliminated. 
In early 1975 the first Minister of Education since the Cultural Revolution was appointed. 
Zhou Rungzin was openly critical of low standards and the lack of scientific research. The 
radicals with Chang Tiehsheng in the forefront attacked the Minister. Qinghua university 
administrators wrote Mao complaining of the low standards in university education, saying 
that some school graduates who entered university were "not even capable of reading a 
book". Mao gave the letter to a group of radical students at Qinghua and told them to 
struggle against the "right deviationist wind on the educational front."1 9 In many ways 
this was to be the final battle of the Cultural Revolution decade with the Gang of Four 
determined to destroy the political power of the by then terminnaly ill Premier, his 
recently rehabilitated protege Deng Xiaoping and their moderate supporters. In February, 
1976 Zhou Enlai died. In April, Deng Xiaoping was purged. It appeared as if the radicals 
might be within reach of victory or, at least, a strengthened position from which they 
could control areas like education. But within months Chairman Mao was dead and within 
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weeks of his death in September, 1976 the Gang of Four was purged. A new coalition of 
veteran civilian and military leaders began to direct China along a course of economic 
development in which pragmatism, not politics, has been in command. In the past three 
years this leadership has dismantled dozens of Mao's policies. None have been so quickly 
or thoroughly reversed as those in the field of education. 
Education Since Mao: Primary & Middle 
Changes in education policy and practices at the primary and middle school level came 
rapidly after Mao's death and the purge of the Gang of Four in the fall of 1976. The 
major thrust of the reforms was to raise the quality of education by emphasizing disci-
pline, respect for teachers, and the importance of basic as distinct from applied and 
political knowledge. The desperate rush to elevate quality has led to far less local autonomy 
and variation in the regular school system as attempts have been made to unify standards, 
curricular, text books and the length of schooling.20 On this last point it appears that the 
question of extending the ten year school period is still being actively discussed and 
perhaps hotly debated. In the summer of 1977, Suzanne Pepper, an American specialist on 
Chinese education was told by Ministry officials that it would not be changed.21 Interviews 
I had with the Ministry in June, 1979 indicated that this question was under active review. 
Later a Chinese university official told me that the Ministry of Education has already made 
the decision to increase the length of schooling to eleven years by increasing the Senior 
Middle School period from two to three years thus providing a total of eleven years for 
pre-university education.22 
Of critical importance in raising the level of educational quality has been the priority 
given to elevating the standards of teachers and providing them with better working 
conditions. Tens, perhaps hundreds of thousands, of China's more than ten million 
teachers, began to teach during the Cultural Revolution decade with no normal school 
training. A significant percentage of these were not Middle School graduates, and some 
had never even attended Middle School. Countless better qualified teachers were arbitrarily 
dismissed or transferred to other jobs. For example, in Shandong province alone 17,000 
teachers left their posts for one reason or another during the Cultural Revolution decade. 
Throughout China there is now a drive to have these people returned to the class room. 
In the case of Shandong, 10,500 had returned by March, 1979 23 
Ultimately the solution to the problem of teaching quality will be the increasing 
percentage of new teachers who are graduates of Normal Universities. In the meantime, 
teachers are being encouraged to upgrade themselves by part-time study in special pro-
grammes initiated by universities as well as correspondence, radio and television courses. 
It is difficult to acquire national statistics on the numbers involved in such programmes, 
but the limited data that is available from some provinces indicate the figures could 
be extremely high. For example, in the spring of 1979,80,000 teachers were enrolled 
in a correspondence school for teachers in Shanxi province where courses were offered 
in math, physics, chemistry and Chinese.24 In Hunan province 160,000 primary as well 
as middle school teachers were reported to be engaged in part-time study through corres-
pondence courses.25 If these figures are at all representative, they would suggest that well 
over 2.5 million primary, and middle school teachers are currently upgrading themselves 
through part-time correspondence courses. 
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Almost immediately after the downfall of the Gang of Four the government set about 
to improve the working conditions of China's teachers. In early 1977 they were guaranteed 
that five-sixth of their time could be devoted to academic work with a minimum of 
interference by other responsibilities such as political study and activity. The government 
has also forbidden other administrative units from interfering with the assignment of 
teachers.26 Revolutionary committees which ran the schools are being disbanded and 
replaced by the authority of principals and vice-principals working under the general 
policy supervision of party committees. 
A more controversial scheme for raising standards is the reintroduction of the system 
of streaming which dates back to the early 1950's but was never used extensively. Students 
are streamed into fast and slow or fast, average and slow classes according to their examination 
marks.27 The system continues to be one of the most hotly debated areas of Chinese 
education, both on pedagogical and ideological grounds. In March, 1979, for instance, 
the Jilin Daily published a work study report entitled "Adopt measures to abolish slow 
classes" and included letters from their readers who argued that the disadvantages of the 
system far outweighed the assumed advantages. 
Primary and middle school are where students receive a basic education. 
This is particularly true for primary schools. How can we judge a student 
to be a slow learner once and for all from the results of a single examination ? 
Furthermore, with classes divided into two categories faster learners will 
make more rapid progress while slow ones will become even slower in study. 
As a result, teachers of slow learning classes lose confidence, students in such 
classes cannot hold their heads up and their parents feel ashamed. If this 
situation is allowed to go unchecked, how can it not affect the advancement 
of the quality of education.28 
Officials admit it is controversial but claim that students are not locked into a stream 
and can be moved to another if their rate of progress changes. 
The issue of streaming remained a major focal point of educational controversy 
throughout the summer of 1979. A major report by two New China News Agency 
(NCNA) reporters who had attended several educational conferences and visited many 
schools stressed that it was an extremely controversial practice, that the best teachers 
were assigned exclusively to "fast" classes, and that slower learners were being ignored 
and were losing confidence. The report went on: 
Furthermore, some localities and schools are purely seeking a high percentage 
of graduates admitted to higher-level schools, and many secondary schools 
have turned their "fast progress" classes into "higher examination" classes. . . 
Certain people have also regarded the percentage of graduates admitted to 
higher level schools as the sole criterion for evaluating the operation of a 
school.29 
Various comments by high educational officials, including a July 17,1979 broadcast of 
remarks made earlier by Education Minister Jiang Nanxiang, argue that streaming has been 
made necessary by the severe damage done to educational quality by the Gang of Four 
and Lin Biao. The major thrust of these arguments is that it is a temporary expedient 
designed to quickly raise standards, and teachers must not ignore their responsibilities to 
the slower learners.30 
Perhaps the most significant reversal of educational policy since Mao was the re-
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introduction of the key school system at all levels from primary to university in the fall 
of 1977. Schools were designated "key" ones at all levels from district and county to 
municipality, province and nation. In January, 1978 there were twenty primary and 
middle schools designated as national key schools, directly responsible to the Ministry of 
Education in Peking. In June, 1979 Ministry officials told me that there were now over 
1,000 key primary and middle schools run by other jurisdictions throughout the country. 
The spokesman indicated that the Ministry now felt this number might be excessive and 
was actively studying the possibility of reducing it. In Shanghai, Fudan University officials 
reported that the city's ten districts each had two or three key middle and primary 
schools, as did the city's ten suburban counties. Shanghai has two key middle schools 
directly responsible to the Ministry of Education and one each to Fudan University and 
the Shanghai Teachers University. 
Admission to the key schools is exclusively by entrance examination. Those who do 
not receive a sufficiently high score at each level enter regular schools. I was told that the 
examination for entry to key primary schools is a predominantly oral test in which general 
levels of intelligence and knowledge are examined. Parents I spoke with said they taught 
their pre-school children some characters and basic math to prepare them for these tests. 
While the key school system does not itself appear to be publicly debated, certain 
aspects of it are. In June, 1979, for example, the Jilin Daily attacked the practice of 
entrance exams for primary schools arguing that to select "only the brightest through 
testing.. .runs counter to the materialist theory of knowledge and is unreasonable." 
The newspaper also argued that students should not be allowed to go beyond the district 
in which they lived to enter a key school.31 Officials argue that the key school system is 
designed to do more than provide the highest standards of education to the best students. 
Key schools are regarded as centres of experimentation in curricula, teaching methods and 
materials which can serve as models for the regular school system. Both teachers and 
administrative officials from regular schools visit and observe what is happening at key 
schools. However valid this side of the key school structure may in fact be, it nevertheless 
injects an elitist orientation to the primary and middle school structure of China which is 
undoubtedly disputed within inner party circles, and remains vulnerable to the attack of 
a more radical leadership. 
While the main emphasis in recent educational reforms has been on the elevation of 
quality, higher participation rates continue to be a major concern. In the summer of 1977 
Suzanne Pepper was told by Ministry of Education officials that 95% of China's primary 
school age children, or 150 million students, attended school, a figure 6.2 times the pre-
1949 one.32 In the spring of 1978 the Clark Kerr study group was given the same figures.33 
Ministry officials told me in June, 1979 that China's 940,000 primary schools enrolled a 
total of 140 million students. Later that month the state Statistical Bureau issued official 
statistics in a number of areas and reported that 7,870,000 children attended kindergarten 
and 146,240,000 went to primary school.34 While the discrepancies may be explained by 
a move toward more refined statistical analysis in China generally, and should not there-
fore be considered very important, it appears evident that improved success in lowering 
the birth rate in China's cities may also be a factor. Ministry and university officials as 
well as recent émigrés from major cities indicate that a number of primary schools have 
been closed because of the lowering birth rate in centres like Beijing, Shanghai, Tienjin 
and Guangzhou. 
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At the secondary school level Pepper was informed that 123,000 regular junior and 
middle schools had a total enrollment of 58,280,000 in 1977. This was claimed to be 
56 times the number prior to 1949 and 3.8 times the 1966 figure.35 Clark Kerr's group 
was given a figure of 68,900,000 million a year later.36 Officials told me the number was 
65 million, a figure that later that month was only slightly refined by the report of the 
Statistical Bureau to a total of 65,480,000 37 One possible explanation for the major 
discrepancy between the 1978 and 1979 figures comes from reports of émigrés in Hong 
Kong which indicate that in a number of locations the level of primary school graduates 
has been so low that a large number are not being allowed to continue immediately to 
junior middle school. Reports I heard in Hong Kong in July, 1979 indicated that in 
Guangzhou 20% were being held back while in Hangzhou the reported figure was 40%. 
These figures do not include secondary technical school education the expansion of 
which is currently being given considerable emphasis. I was told that China had 2,760 
such schools with a total enrollment of 880,000. While Pepper had been given a figure of 
799,000 students in the summer of 1977 the Statistical Bureau's report of June, 1979 
indicated that the current enrollment of 880,000 was 200,000 more than in 1977.38 
These figures do not include an estimated 1,200 factory or enterprise-operated vocational 
schools supervised by the Labour Bureau under the State Council. In addition, there are 
68,000,000 Chinese enrolled in spare time primary and middle school programmes of 
all types.39 
It is extremely difficult to translate these statistics into percentage rates of attendance 
and generally accepted rates of literacy. Ministry officials now claim that primary school 
education is universal or has been "popularized" in all but the most remote areas. I was 
told that 95% of primary school age children attend school and that it is only in the 
remote areas that the drop out rate is at all significant. Since in China basic literacy is 
normally considered to be attained by primary school graduates, these figures would 
indicate that within several years China may come close to attaining near universal literacy 
for the under twenty-five age group. The qualification "basic" however should be stressed 
for in the rural areas where 80% of China's population live, drop out rates are higher, 
teaching standards lower, and the school week and school year shorter.40 Given these 
problems, it is very difficult to determine just what the level of a primary school 
graduate is. 
Statistics for secondary school participation rates present even greater difficulties of 
interpretation. The Chinese target for 1985 is to make junior middle school education 
universal in rural areas and senior middle school education universal in urban areas. 
Ministry officials told me that in China's major cities senior middle school education was 
already universal. When I expressed some skepticism they indicated that not only did all 
attend senior middle school but that all graduated. My continued skepticism led only to 
the qualification that this was true only of the largest cities and did not include their 
suburbs. Since it is easier for the Chinese government to provide middle school education 
to China's urban youth than it is to give them jobs the general claim is probably true. 
As one Chinese spokesman said to me, "what else can they do?" No hard data appears to 
be available on current national statistics, but most interviewers felt that on a national 
basis well over 50% entered junior middle school, but considerably less than that went on 
to senior middle school. 
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Education Since Mao: Higher 
The Key University System and Entrance Exams 
The reversal of policies in higher education since 1977, particularly the re-introduction 
of the key university system and nationally unified entrance exams, have essentially 
restored the system of pre-Cultural Revolution days. As of early June 1979 there were 
89 key institutions of higher education.41 Twenty-six of these institutions are responsible 
directly to the national Ministry of Education. The others are responsible to a wide variety 
of other jurisdictions including the provincial governments, other national ministries and 
academies. For example, the Peking Medical Institute is directly under the Ministry of 
Health, while the Nanjing Engineering Institute is responsible directly to the Academy 
of Sciences. 
The concentration of the best resources, professors, and students in key universities is 
justified not only on the basis of China's need to make up the lost ten years in quality 
education and research. It is also viewed as the best means of raising standards generally 
by means of experimentation, the training of future professors for other institutions and 
the model the key institutions provide. Officials at Shanghai's "key" Fudan university 
explained how university authorities and scholars from other institutions visit their 
campus to observe and adopt those ideas suitable to their own universities. The primary 
purpose of the key universities is to train research scholars and professors for other univer-
sities, academies and leading research institutes throughout the nation. This emphasis on 
quality education in key institutions has been reiterated in a number of ways. One recent 
example is the fact that several key universities appear to be readjusting earlier enrollment 
targets downward. At Beida for example, the original target for a total enrolment in 1985 
of 20,000 students, is being studied and will, I was told by an official at that university, 
probably be lowered to between 15,000 and 18,000. 
While priority is given to quality at the key universities, in the nation's overall policy 
for higher education quantity is also being stressed. In 1973 only 400 institutions of 
higher education were in operation in China. In 1979 the number had jumped to 598 
enrolling a total of 850,000 students. This figure was 230,000 higher than that for 1977 
and compares with a total university enrollment in 1965 of 674,000 42 With a population 
now officially estimated at 975,000,000 this means that an extraordinarily tiny fraction 
of the population will receive a university education. The United States with one quarter 
China's population enrolls more than fifteen times as many university students, while 
Canada with a population of just over 2% that of China's enrolls about 50% as many 
university students "In order for 10 percent of the age cohort to be in higher education 
— a minimum level for a modernized industrial nation, will require at least a multiplication 
of the present system by 15 times over."43 It is extremely unlikely, even if China's 
modernization drive is relatively successful, that the nation will come anywhere near 
achieving this by the end of the century. 
While the Ministry of Education determines enrollment policy this is now done in close 
collaboration with other ministries, government divisions, and the universities. Decisions 
on 1978 enrollment, for instance, were settled at a national conference on higher educa-
tion attended by representatives of China's universities. New universities are being opened 
and existing ones expanded. Nearly 200 new institutions of higher education were opened 
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in 1978.44 One report indicates a national target for 1985 of 3,200,000 students at 1,500 
institutions of higher learning 45 If comparative figures with the industrialized west on 
university enrollment are exceptionally low, absolute figures for China's overall educa-
tional system are extraordinary. Total student enrollment in primary, middle and post-
secondary institutions has now reached 210 million students supported by 10 million 
teachers and educational workers.46 These figures, Ministry officials told me, do not 
include part-time study. 
The most significant change in higher education since the Autumn of 1976 has been 
the reintroduction of the nationally unified college entrance examinations, first held in 
December 1977 for the 1978 spring semester. These are now considered a "permanent" 
feature of the system. In 1977 the examinations were written and administered on a 
provincial basis. In 1978 they were nationally unified and set by the Ministry of Educa-
tion.47 Exams are currently set by a committee of university scholars established by the 
Ministry and are administered and marked by enrollment committees of similar compo-
sition at different administrative levels. 
Today, students may attempt the exams any number of times until they are twenty-
five years of age. In 1977, and to a lesser extent in 1978, exceptions to this age limit 
allowed students up to 30 to attempt the exams, thereby providing some opportunity for 
university education to a fraction of those who were denied it by the Cultural Revolution. 
The age limit for exceptions, of which there will be extremely few in 1979, was lowered 
to 28.48 Both Ministry and university officials indicated to me that the age limit will likely 
soon drop to 23 as more and more students enter university directly from middle school. 
Increased enrollment in China's middle schools as well as some opportunity for rusti-
cated youth to try the exams has made competition fierce. In 1977,5.7 million students 
attempted the college entrance exams of whom 278,000 were eventually enrolled. The 
initial target had been 218,000, but a conference on education held in the spring of 1978 
decided to establish an additional 55 regular institutions of higher education including 
13 which had been abolished or merged in 1971. As a result of these decisions an addi-
tional 60,000 students could be immediately accommodated.49 
In 1978,6.9 million candidates sat for the exams of whom 300,000 were initially 
enrolled. Later an additional 100,000 were registered in several "affiliated" or "branch" 
universities associated with a few of China's major universities. Beida, for example, 
enrolled an additional 800 students. The "affiliated" organizations appear to use regular 
university faculty on a rotating basis. The students do not live on campus as all others do, 
but are commuters who take classes in different locations. Some instruction is by tele-
vision and radio. In July, 1979,4.7 million candidates attempted the three-day exams for 
an estimated 270,000 to 300,000 freshmen places.50 A Ministry of Education official 
explained that the number dropped in 1979 because of increased educational opportuni-
ties for China's middle school graduates in vocational, technical and spare-time educational 
programmes, as well as an improvement in opportunities for urban employment.51 The 
number also dropped because of the lowered age limit and the fewer rusticated youth 
thereby allowed to attempt the exams. 
Candidates do not have to be middle school graduates although as China's educational 
system returns to normal an increasing percentage are. In 1977 only 30% of the freshman 
class entered university directly from middle school. What percentage of the remaining, 
who were largely rusticated youth, were nevertheless earlier graduates of middle school is 
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not known. In 1978 these figures were exactly reversed. In July 1979, 67% of those who 
sat the exams were middle school graduates.52 University officials told me these figures 
would rise dramatically in the next few years. 
Students write a set of either liberal arts or science exams. In 1979 37% of the candi-
dates wrote the arts exams and 67% the science set. Liberal arts students are examined on 
politics, Chinese, mathematics, history, geography and a foreign language. The science set 
includes exams on politics, Chinese, a foreign language, math, and adds physics and 
chemistry. In 1977 there was no foreign language exam. It was introduced in 1978 but 
at that time given no weight and only used as a "reference indicator". In 1979 the foreign 
language exam mark will be given a weight of 10% that of each of the others, (which them-
selves have equal weightings) for those students wishing to enter a key university. It is 
expected that this will be raised each year until the foreign language exam for entrance to 
key universities soon has an equal weighting with the other subjects. For entrance to regular 
universities the foreign language exam will remain only a reference point until foreign 
language study becomes more advanced throughout the nation's middle school system.53 
Foreign language study, particularly English and Japanese, is being given exceptional 
priority throughout the educational system, but as in other areas it will be some years 
before the full damage of the Cultural Revolution decade can be repaired. 
While most informants described the exams as "not very difficult" or "rather easy", 
they do establish a minimum standard for college entrance. (See Appendix B for a com-
pleted copy of the 1979 English language exam). Normally marked out of a total score 
of 500, some of the top universities such as Beida, Qinghua and Fudan indicated that most 
of their freshman class in 1978 scored around the 400 level. This varied from department 
to department with normally higher scores being required in math and physics. Students 
who excel in particular subjects can be admitted to key universities with a somewhat 
lower average mark. Those who do not attain these high standards can be enrolled in 
the key universities' "affiliated" operations, regular universities or radio and television 
correspondence universities.54 Candidates for medical colleges take the regular science 
examination. Enrollment committees at the key universities select from lists of candidates 
perhaps 25 to 30% greater than the number of places they have available. Students can 
list 10 universities and two disciplines in each as their choice, for a total combination 
of 20 possible assignments. Of these ten, five may be key universities.55 
The entrance exam is not the only criterion for university admission, but it is by far 
the most important. Students must also prove they are medically fit and of acceptable 
political background. All who attain the minimum mark in the entrance exam must under-
go a physical examination. Extremely few handicapped students attend any of China's 
regular or key institutions of higher education. The political criterion is no longer one of 
class background. Today, it appears to be little more than a character reference, albeit a 
detailed and documented one, from the candidate's middle school and/or work unit. 
Since intellectuals are now considered "labouring people" their children are admitted to 
university as members of the working class, or if they have come from a period of time in 
the countryside, as peasants. 
The political report that accompanies a student's marks in the dossier sent to university 
enrollment committees is, in fact, the summary of a political or moral assessment that is 
begun at the primary school level. In primary schools, reports on every student's behaviour 
are written regularly throughout each school year and must be read, signed and returned 
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by the parents. The reports emphasize the student's attitude towards study, labour, class-
mates and teachers. At the end of primary school a summary of these goes with the 
student to his/her middle school. At that level the same procedure is followed with a final 
summary being sent to the universities.56 While one's conduct at middle school can prevent 
a brilliant student from entering university, his or her middle school academic record is not 
taken into consideration at all. The student's academic ability is judged exclusively by the 
college entrance exam. Officials indicated to me that this might change later when China's 
pre-university educational system is fully restored and standards elevated. The disruption 
of the Cultural Revolution decade was so severe that in the official view, middle school 
marks at this time might mean very little, if anything. 
There remain persistent reports from returning overseas Chinese visitors, foreign experts 
teaching in China and others that "guanxi", or "connections", so important throughout 
Chinese history, still play an important role in most areas of Chinese life from getting 
favored overseas diplomatic postings to being included in educational and technical dele-
gations going abroad. In higher education the college entrance exam has undoubtedly 
decreased the value of "guanxi" or entering by "the back door". Those who mark the 
exams do not see the candidate's name and in the few celebrated cases where favouritism 
has been exercised and discovered the incidents have evoked nation-wide attention. 
Perhaps the most celebrated case was that of Wang Xiaping who entered Beida's depart-
ment of law in 1977, only to be expelled later when it was discovered that his father, a 
high Shanxi provincial party authority, ordered an invigilator to arrange for answered 
papers to be smuggled into the local examination hall. 
By the spring of 1980 the last of China's pre-entrance exam or 'worker-peasant' 
soldier' classes will have graduated. At that point virtually all entering students will be 
middle school graduates, most of them coming directly from secondary institutions to 
universities. Chosen on a fiercely competitive national exam system the quality of the 
student body should be far superior to that of the early 1970's. Some observers, however, 
would question the degree to which there is any significant difference in the class back-
ground of the two groups of students, arguing that essentially the same students went to 
university but with the difference that their educational development was interrupted by 
at least two years of labor. When I suggested that this was the case to university officials 
and professors in June 1979, they insisted it was not so. As one irate professor, whom I 
perhaps pushed a little far on the point, responded, "No that is simply not so. My god we 
should know, we had to teach them!" Even if a significant number of the earlier worker-
peasant students were in fact "recycled" youth from privileged urban groups, the disrup-
tion in their educational backgrounds made many ill-prepared for a university education. 
As China enters the 1980's the effects of these disruptions on China's university students 
are diminishing rapidly and the nation's university teachers are ecstatic about being 
allowed to teach, with little political disruption, a body of competitively chosen, bright, 
well motivated students. 
Curriculum 
One of the first reforms implemented after the fall of the Gang of Four was the lengthen-
ing of the three year university programme back to four years. Initially all programmes 
were lengthened to four years but early exceptions to allow five year programmes were 
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given to some universities for medicine, archeology and some foreign languages. The 
general policy is currently under review and some institutions such as Qinghua have 
applied, and it appears will receive approval, for five year science and engineering pro-
grammes. Beida officials told me that this was also being discussed, but with the exception 
of the foreign language departments, the majority of faculty favoured the retention of a 
four year system for both arts and science. Fudan indicated that the discussion there 
seemed to be arriving at a concensus of four years in arts and five in science. 
All institutions are now placing a very major emphasis on foreign language study. 
Most foreign language institutes now have teachers hired from abroad and by the fall of 
1979 this will likely also be true of foreign language departments in China's leading univer-
sities. All students in Chinese universities are required to study at least one foreign language. 
At the post-graduate level at Qinghua and presumably in the science and applied science 
fields of other institutions, two foreign languages are required. 
The earlier requirement that faculty and students spend a significant amount of time 
in manual labour has been diluted to the point of virtual extinction. Universities maintain 
workshops and factories on their campuses, but neither faculty nor students spend time 
in them. While estimates of the length of time students spend in labour varied slightly 
from place to place (four to eight weeks) the usual answer I was given was that they were 
expected to spend a total of four or five weeks in labour at some point before they 
graduated. This might take the form of a week or so each year, or as reported for one 
university, all four weeks at the outset of the university programme "to get it over"! 
At the faculty level physical labour is at best an occasional and not very strenuous ritual. 
Some told me they no longer did any, while others chuckled that they had "picked castor 
beans once", and others that they occasionally "helped sweep up"! Qinghua authorities 
indicated that faculty over the age of 50 were entirely exempt. 
Political study for students now appears to be exclusively covered by the regular 
political science course which emphasizes Marxist theory and the history of the Chinese 
Communist Party. Faculty still engage in regular political study sessions. At Quinghua I 
was told these occupied one or two afternoons each week, while at Fudan one afternoon 
a week is the usual routine. My Fudan hosts explained that these sessions covered political 
events abroad as well as within China, that they usually studied documents such as party 
and state reports, the speeches of leaders, and newspaper editorials. These were discussed 
in small groups of twenty or thirty faculty members. On other occasions the entire faculty 
meets in the University auditorium to listen to a major political address. 
Instruction and research in most of the pre-Cultural Revolution subjects appear to 
have been resumed. Thus for example, Beida has resumed classes within its Philosophy 
department on major world religions. Psychology, which was damned and outlawed as a 
"sham" by the Gang of Four, has been rehabilitated as a "science" and those purged in the 
earlier "criticize psychology" movement have been fully rehabilitated.57 Entirely new 
departments are being established in areas particularly relevant to China's modernization 
drive. For example, twelve colleges and universities in Shanghai have formulated plans to 
establish departments to teach administration.58 China has even established a "Tourism 
University" in Shanghai to train managerial cadres in a two year course that includes 
foreign language, hotel service, economics, geography and computer technology. Admission 
is only possible through the national unified college entrance exams.59 
Another change that may come in the near future is a move toward interdisciplinary 
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studies. In February 1979 the President of the Shanghai Number 1 Medical College urged 
this, indicating that China needs comprehensive universities that will incorporate the study 
of medicine, science and engineering. He blamed the lack of interdisciplinary studies on 
China's original adoption of the Soviet model in higher education.60 At the present time 
the medical sciences are taught entirely in separate institutions. This presents obvious 
problems in the area of basic science training in the medical universities. It also inhibits 
other new departures. My hosts at Sichuan Medical College, for example, were extremely 
interested in learning about the University of Toronto's Department of Bio-Medical 
Engineering, an interdisciplinary division supported by both the medical and engineering 
faculties. Under the present organizational structure of Chinese universities this kind of 
co-operative interdisciplinary venture would be impossible within one institution. 
The Degree System and Graduate Studies 
Chinese universities do not confer degrees in the traditional western sense. However, they 
are currently studying the introduction of degrees and their motivation for doing so might 
well be their recognition that such a system would facilitate placing their graduates in 
foreign universities. A Beida official explained that some faculty there favoured the intro-
duction of a degree system of four years for the B.A., two for an M.A. and four for a 
Ph.D. University officials generally seemed to think approval would soon be forthcoming 
for some such system. An article in the May 27,1979 issue of the GuangmingDaily 
supported the restoration of academic degrees and suggested criteria for the evaluation 
of doctoral work including the defence of the dissertation.61 
Literally a decade passed without China's universities being involved in graduate educa-
tion in any systematic way or to any significant degree. As some of the nation's universities 
graduated their first post-Cultural Revolution students in 1973, they prepared to accept 
very limited numbers of these graduates into advanced study in 1973 or 1974. Beida, for 
example, indicated to me in a visit to that campus in the spring of 1973, that they were 
hoping to enroll about 150 science and 100 Arts graduates that Fall. But those who 
attended graduate programmes were sharply criticized by radicals for pursuing an elitist 
and individualistic road, and while some graduate work did go on during the Gang of Four 
era, it received little official encouragement and was limited in both scope and quality. 
Shortly after the death of Mao and the purge of the Gang of Four, Ministry and univer-
sity officials began to discuss plans for the full restoration of graduate programmes. 
In November 1977, the Ministry of Education and the Academy of Sciences issued a 
joint notice containing instructions for the admission of graduate students. These included 
the restoration of an entrance exam. In some fields national graduate entrance exams were 
held in the early 1950's, but none were given after the Great Leap Forward later in that 
decade. While no indication was given in the Fall of 1977 as to how many graduate 
students should be enrolled, it was announced that 200 institutions of higher education 
as well as research institutes of the Academy of Science and various government depart-
ments would accept graduate students in the Fall of 1978. An NCNA report of March 1979 
stated that over 200 institutions of higher education and more than 100 scientific research 
institutes had been approved to accept research students. These included all the research 
institutes affiliated with both the Chinese Academy of Science and the Chinese Academy 
of Social Sciences. Also approved were a wide variety of scientific research organizations 
and offices under various central governmental ministries, and a few of the better qualified 
17 Education in China since Mao 
ones under the jurisdiction of provinces, municipalities, autonomous regions, and the 
armed forces. 
The same report indicated that entrance exams would include tests on political ideology, 
foreign language, "basic knowledge" and basic professional topics. 
The political ideology test aims to find out to what degree a candidate 
has mastered basic Marxist-Leninist theories. It will test how a candidate 
has mastered basic principles of philosophy, political economics, scien-
tific socialism and the basic theory of the CCP in leading China's revolu-
tion and construction; how a candidate has understood the guidelines of 
the third plenum of the 11th CCP Central Committee, and how a candi-
date has criticized the various fallacies of Lin Biao and the gang of four 
in tampering with Marxism-Lenimsim-Mao-Zedong thought. 
The report also stated that students must prove that they have a knowledge of grammar 
and have attained a certain level of ability in translation of one foreign language.62 
In the 1978-79 academic year China's universities had a total graduate student enroll-
ment of 8,000 students.63 In the spring of 1979 China's best known science and engineer-
ing university, Qinghua, had only 350 graduate students, but it was planning for an 
estimated total of 3,000 in a few years time. The situation at Beida was similar with a 
spring 1979 enrollment of 460 graduate students. Fudan admitted a few graduate students 
in 1977, but only formally resumed their graduate admissions in 1978. By the spring of 
1979 they had a total of only 300 graduate students. The Sichuan Medical College was 
planning to admit graduates in September 1979.64 In June 1979 over 2,400 candidates 
sat the entrance exams for post-graduate courses in Peking's universities and research 
institutes.65 It will obviously take several years to restore fully graduate education in the 
People's Republic of China. The consequences for a nation of almost one billion people 
desperately struggling to modernize against immense social and economic problems, of 
virtually going without serious graduate education for a decade are almost beyond 
comprehension. 
University Administration and Working Conditions 
Until recently, Chinese universities, like other areas of post-Cultural Revolution China, 
have been run by revolutionary committees. While representation on these varied from 
campus to campus, they usually included representatives of the Workers Propaganda 
teams and PLA units which had re-established order in the universities as they re-opened 
in the early 1970's. The committees normally also included representatives of the veteran 
cadres, workers, professors and students. For example, the Qinghua revolutionary com-
mittee in the spring of 1973, consisted of six teachers, six staff workers, five cadres, five 
students, four workers propaganda team members, four representatives of the PLA, and 
one dependant of a staff member. 
Since the downfall of the Gang of Four the workers propaganda teams have been 
withdrawn and the revolutionary committees are being replaced by a dual authority 
structure in which the traditional academic/administrative leadership of the universities 
is overseen by the ultimate policy authority of the party committee. Under the revolu-
tionary committee structure, universities and research institutes were often led and 
administered by personnel who had little if any background directly related to the 
institutions they ran. Today the daily administration of Chinese universities is in the 
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hands of a President or Chancellor and a number of vice-presidents or vice-chancellors 
each with a responsibility for a functional division of the University's affairs, not dissimilar 
to such divisions of major Western institutions. Qinghua for example has six vice-
presidents, while Beida has eight. In many cases the most senior academic/administrative 
leaders will also be party members and sit on the party committee which sets the overall 
policy for the institution and ensures that it follows national party policies. 
Chinese universities and research institutes have not moved back to their traditional 
duality of academic/party leadership without facing serious problems, many of which will 
take years to overcome fully. At some institutions, cadres who know little about education 
have retained too much authority, while at others there has been a growing concern that 
scientists are too often distracted from their research and teaching by being given heavy 
administrative burdens. One of the most interesting examples of difficulties encountered 
in returning to pre-Cultural Revolution norms of academic leadership was provided by 
Shandong University where an enlarged meeting of its academic committee held in early 
1979 and presided over by the University President, 
expressed the hope that the secretary of the party committee and the 
president of the university would take the lead in emancipating their minds, 
assume responsibility and take measures to encourage cadres to learn profes-
sional work in order to acquaint themselves with the work of an institute of 
higher learning and to handle matters in accordance with the principles of 
education. 
The president and party secretary "accepted the responsibility for the criticisms by 
academic committee members and made self-criticism."66 In February 1979 the Peking 
Municipal Science and Technology Committee held a working conference of all the 
research institutes in the capital. Participants urged the party to discontinue its role in 
daily administration. "Leadership over professional and administrative affairs should be 
entirely delegated to the director and deputy director." This would leave the party free 
to exercise its leadership in the policy area and allow the professionals to get on which 
the task of running the institution.67 
If recent changes in the administration of Chinese universities have reinforced the 
traditional role of academic administrators, this has been at the expense of students as 
well as cadre participation in university policy making. It is difficult to judge the real 
influence exercised by student representatives on former revolutionary committees of 
Chinese universities. Their numbers varied considerably. For example, in 1973 five of 
Qinghua's thirty-one revolutionary committee members were students, while at Beida 
that year the figure was seven of thirty-nine and at Jungshan University in Guangzhou it 
was only two of thirty-two.68 With the return of pre-Cultural Revolution authority 
structures, the role of student leadership has moved into the more traditional areas of 
extra-curricular activities. Elected student unions or associations were sufficiently well 
organized by the spring of 1979 to hold the 19th Congress of All-China Students 
Federation, which defined their main function as providing a link between the student 
masses, the Party committee and the school's Communist Youth League organization 
(CYL). While CYL members on campus might continue to exert some influence on policy 
through their links with the party committee, student associations as such wield little if 
any direct influence on university policy or its implementation. As Shanghai radio reported 
in the spring of 1979, "Some students erroneously believed that, in bringing democracy 
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into play, it is necessary to have student self-government. Such a trend has now been 
eliminated through ideological education."69 It is ironic that the "student power move-
ment" in western universities gained some of its inspiration from the power China's youth 
temporarily exerted during the Cultural Revolution, when today the role of China's 
university students in the affairs of their institutions appears to be virtually non-existent, 
and certainly less significant than in most major North American universities. 
All of these changes are undoubtedly welcomed by the faculty of China's universities. 
With relatively little time being required for political study and virtually none in manual 
labour, China's professors are getting back to the task of teaching and doing research. 
They have seen the return of good students to their classrooms, are enjoying the return of 
full access to the foreign literature in their fields and the resumption of direct contact with 
foreign scholars. China's professors are also beginning to enjoy improved living conditions 
and are looking forward to possible salary increases. With only a very few exceptions in 
1963, no Chinese professor has had a salary increase or promotion since 1956. Current 
university salaries range from about 53 to around 350 RMB, or approximately Cnd. $40 
to $250. Now the salary and rank system is under active review and changes are imminent. 
Teaching loads appear to be similar to those in most North American institutions, with 
the average Chinese professor teaching from six to eight hours a week. But student/staff 
ratios averaging about 3 to 1 are ridiculously low by most western standards. Even when 
the targeted enrollment is reached they will be a very attractive ratio of about 4 to 1. 
A major problem facing China's universities is the large number of underqualified, and 
often totally unqualified teachers who were brought into the system during the Cultural 
Revolution decade. Western visitors have been told with remarkable candour that these 
people represent a major embarrassment. While most are not now teaching, they cannot 
be summarily dismissed. Some are being assigned teaching positions at the primary and 
middle school level, while still others are receiving new assignments on campus which do 
not involve instruction or research. 
International Educational Exchange 
In the early 1970's China negotiated a very limited number of student exchange agree-
ments with western nations. A Canadian-Chinese agreement, for example, was signed in 
1973 which included the principle of reciprocity. Since the autumn of that year there have 
always been at least twenty exchange students in each country and in recent years, the 
Chinese have more than doubled the number studying in Canadian universities. Until 1977 
all Chinese under the agreement in Canada were language students. Since then a few in 
science and engineering have come. The Chinese government also slowly resumed its 
programme of hiring foreign language teachers, but here too the number remained very 
restricted until after the fall of the Gang of Four. While only a very few Chinese professors 
were sent abroad until the post-Mao period, and then normally for only very short visits, 
the number of educational, scientific and technological delegations that travelled to the 
West and Japan for periods of from three to eight weeks was far more significant. 
In 1978 the Chinese made it known that they intended to send thousands of advanced 
students, teachers and researchers abroad, particularly in the areas of pure and applied 
science, engineering, technology and medicine. Canada was initially slated to be sent 500 
but in June, 1979, a bilateral Canadian-Chinese agreement was signed allowing for appro-
ximately 100 Chinese "scholars" (i.e. Chinese not registered in degree programmes) to 
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attend Canadian universities. Thousands of other Chinese scholars are going to Japan, the 
United States and European nations. The Chinese being sent under these programmes are 
predominantly in their late 30's or early 40's and are therefore people who completed 
their university education before the Cultural Revolution, but then experienced the com-
plete disruption of their early years of teaching and research by that political upheaval. 
For the better part of a decade most of them were without access to their laboratories, 
libraries or any significant contact with international advances in their fields. The major 
purpose of their usual two year study periods abroad is to make up for those lost years 
by updating themselves in terms of western scientific knowledge, methodology and the 
use of advanced equipment and techniques. 
Part-time Education 
Since at least the early 1940's the Chinese Communists have developed a wide range of 
spare time, part-work/part-study, special technical, vocational and other educational 
programmes that collectively are often referred to as 'irregular education'. Perhaps the 
best known and most successful of these has been the training of 'barefoot doctors' and 
other paramedical workers. But other programmes in technical and vocational education 
for peasants and workers, normally on a part-time basis, have also flourished. These are 
continuing to receive some priority, particularly now as an alternative to the regular 
universities for those students who do not pass the college entrance exams and are assigned 
jobs in the nation's factories. 
In the summer of 1977 the educational programmes in Chinese factories, known as 
July 21st colleges, had a total enrollment of 780,000 students, while agricultural colleges 
enrolled about one million. In addition there were technical secondary schools in every 
branch of industry run by the central ministry concerned. At that time China was also 
aiming at establishing a secondary school for the mechanization of agriculture in every 
prefecture of the country, as "agricultural mechanization alone requires two million 
technicians trained to the secondary school level or above."70 
The part time educational facilities associated with factories provide their younger 
workers with basic education in math and sciences as well as the technical subjects asso-
ciated with the factory's own area of production. They also usually provide foreign 
language instruction. Since practice varies greatly and no comprehensive statistics are 
available for programmes of this nature a few illustrations from information available in 
the spring of 1979 will have to provide at least a sense of the enormity and importance 
of this kind of education. 
It was estimated for example that 19% of Peking's industrial workers were taking part-
time courses at 4,500 factory-run sparetime classes. In Peking's Capital Iron and Steel 
company 14,000 workers were taking courses in math, physics, chemistry, foreign 
languages, as well as in metallurgy technology. In the next five years the company will 
increase by 2.5 times, the number of its workers and staff with a college level technical 
education.71 In the industrial city of Taiyuan, 60,000 workers in seventy large factories 
and mines were enrolled in spare-time classes, while at the Shengli oilfield in Shandong 
province 40,000 attended classes, of whom 10% were studying English, French, Japanese 
or German.72 A spare-time foreign language institute has been established in Shanghai 
which provides a two-year course in English, French, German and Japanese to scientists 
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and technicians who upon graduation are expected to be able to read a foreign language 
well enough to translate foreign technical literature.73 
Reports from Shandong indicate that as part of a national plan the province hopes to 
educate all its workers under the age of 35 to at least a middle school or technical secon-
dary school level within three to five years. In the spring of 1979 a reported 300,000 
workers in that province were attending part-time classes. Part-time schools and univer-
sities are not limited to factories. In Peking the Peking Municipal Trade Union Council 
gives courses to workers. In 1978,7,800 of the 11,000 enrolled graduated from courses 
that ranged from three months to three years. Enrollment was only by entrance exam 
and courses included such subjects as mechanical drawing, hydraulic machinery, 
electronics, English and Japanese.74 In Guangzhou the trade union organizations sponsored 
103 spare-time schools in which 41,000 workers and staff participated in short-term 
training courses.75 
The importance of upgrading technical educational facilities in rural China has been 
stressed by China's leaders at national conferences and in major political reports. In March, 
1979, the All-China Scientific and Technological Association met in Shandong to discuss 
part-time scientific and technical education in rural areas. In urging the national promotion 
of this kind of education which is designed to provide part-time educational facilities to 
raise the level of their students to that of a secondary school technical education, the 
report indicated that under the Gang of Four "Some localities had farming machines but 
no one to operate them, insecticides but no one who knew how to use them and chemical 
fertilizers but no one who knew how to apply them.76 In the Yimeng area of that province 
alone, according to a February, 1979,NCNA report, there were more than 3,000 part-time 
science schools with 60,000 students all selected by examination. Courses normally of 
three to four years were offered in farm techniques, engineering, horticulture, and veteri-
nary science as well as basic math, physics, chemistry, zoology and botany. Students were 
selected from junior and senior middle school graduates, production brigade and team 
leaders, and veteran peasants, while teachers were recruited from local peasants, qualified 
high school graduates and experienced technicians.77 
Conclusion 
China's new education policies face a number of difficulties and involve a great many 
short and long term political risks. In many areas the new policies are not being imple-
mented as quickly or as thoroughly as possible. Given the extraordinary shift in education 
policies it is not surprising that problems in implementation are being experienced. Middle 
level cadres responsible for local and regional policy implementation are reluctant to move 
quickly or take any initiative that may leave them vulnerable to criticism should those 
policies shift quickly again because of political change at the top. That particular character-
istic combined with the general inertia of any bureaucracy the size of China's, has always 
been a major obstacle to fundamental and comprehensive policy change. Provincial radio 
broadcasts in recent months have provided many examples of concern in this area. 
Zhejiang for instance reported that "At present the important thing is that some leading 
departments and comrades are still taking a passive wait-and-see attitude."78 Another 
report urged cadres to be more daring in rehabilitating educational leaders who had been 
purged and hiring those who had been in political trouble.79 
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The extreme competitiveness of the entrance examination system at all levels involves 
educational as well as social and political risks.80 A system increasingly geared to nationally 
unified examinations runs the risk, known well in other parts of the world, of parents, 
students and teachers ignoring educational quality and concentrating only on those 
subjects, themes and problems perceived to be most relevant to the next set of exams. 
Educators admitted that this was a serious risk, and that the syndrome of 'why study that, 
it won't be on the exam, has already appeared. A People's Daily editorial in May, 1979, 
reminded middle schools that the majority of students do not go on to university and 
therefore the schools should not just concentrate on the college entrance exams. 
Since the death of Mao, China's pragmatic leaders headed by Vice-Premier Deng 
Xiaoping, have designed a strategy for the most rapid and comprehensive modernization 
of the nation possible. This strategy incorporates major policy shifts and reversals in 
every area, which collectively pose the risk of subverting Chinese socialist, or perhaps 
more accurately, Maoist values. It is modernization, not westernization that is sought by 
China's present leadership just as it has been by China's reformers and revolutionaries 
since the early nineteenth century. Philosophical, ideological and pragmatic means of 
ensuring this distinction have been at the heart of China's great political debates on 
modernization since at least the 1870's. Today concern about this issue is particularly 
apparent in discussions on education policy. In the spring of 1979 in a meeting at Qinghua 
University, Minister of Education, Jiang Nanxiang warned that foreign imports in edu-
cation were not like imported factory equipment and technology which "do not have a 
class character." The Minister continued that in education China must learn from the 
west, but obviously it does not meet with actual conditions in China to run education on 
models from capitalist countries or even to invite foreigners to run Chinese schools."81 
Increasingly frequent calls for more attention to the leadership of the party in China's 
universities and in particular for greater attention to political and ideological work, 
indicate not only a recognition of problems but also provides evidence of the degree to 
which education policy remains sensitive to ideological debate within party circles.82 
The leadership is even more concerned about the level of ideological work required 
amongst those youth who will not get into a university, particularly those who wish to, 
but fail the entrance exams. A predominant theme in reports on Communist Youth 
League activities has been the concern with raising the ideological level of youth so that 
not all will want to go to university and so that those who do but fail to get there will 
recognize the equal value of other futures. A major People's Daily editorial on May 17, 
1979, stressed the fact that it would be impossible for the state to spend more on education 
until the economy developed, and therefore there would be countless youth disappointed 
at not getting into university. These young people and their parents must be educated, 
the editorial stressed to: 
consider the overall situation, relegate personal interests to the interests of the 
State and local interests to overall interests and understand the difficulties of 
the State and schools. . . It is all the more necessary to do meticulous ideological 
work among the large number of young people who fail the entrance examinations. 
There were other ways to contribute, China's national paper argued, 
Those who take the road of self-study and part-time study can scale the peaks 
of science and technology just the same.. . Schools and parents should encourage 
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young people to obey the State's assignments and go where the motherland 
needs them most.83 
The same exhortation has been used over and over again in the provincial press and by 
major national leaders. 
The answer to the problems of a frustrated youth, only a small fraction of whom can 
be absorbed into China's higher educational system, does not he in ideological exhortation. 
It will only be found in general economic progress which will permit urban youth to 
remain in the cities, receive a good technical education and jobs consistent with that 
educational background. Since the Cultural Revolution 17 million Chinese youth have 
been sent to the countryside. Statistics vary on how many remain there. In the summar 
of 1977 a Ministry of Education official said there were still eight million young people 
with either a junior or senior middle school education from the cities working in the 
countryside, and that four million have returned to urban jobs. They also suggested that 
"Henceforth, we are planning for five million senior middle school graduates to go to the 
countryside each year."84 I was told in the summer of 1979 that the policy of sending 
youth to the countryside would continue but that the numbers involved would be 
drastically reduced and the system much improved for the youth who go. If China's 
general modernization drive succeeds and urban population growth declines, the pro-
gramme will eventually be abandoned. Although frequently justified in ideological terms 
the scheme has in fact been primarily motivated by economic necessity. Ministry officials 
told me that because of the decline in population growth in Shanghai, no youth from that 
city were sent to the countryside in 1978. A major problem at this time is the number 
of young people who have returned to the cities, illegally, or for Spring Festival and are 
refusing to go back to the countryside despite the fact they have no jobs, no income and 
no ration coupons, and thus represent a serious financial problem for their families. In the 
spring of 1979, Chinese papers and radio broadcasts were full of appeals from various 
party, state and provincial sources to these youth to return to the countryside and assist 
in the spring harvest. Most reports were candid in admitting that the exhortations were 
far from successful.85 
China's education and youth policies continue to face the dangers of a large number 
of frustrated and disenchanted young people. Millions of intelligent and talented young 
people had no opportunity at all to develop their academic or vocational potential during 
the period 1966 to 1976. Millions have been permanently settled in the countryside. 
Others work in factory jobs that will always be frustrating to them. Until a combination 
of a decline in population growth and a steady rate of economic development occurs, the 
modest expansion available in China's educational system will continue to mean that there 
will be millions of young people unable to get the education they want. There will also be 
unemployed and underemployed youth in the cities and possibly large numbers of dis-
enchanted and potentially angry youth forcibly sent to the countryside. 
The youth of the Cultural Revolution decade whose education was aborted or hope-
lessly disrupted represent a lost generation of disillusioned and often embittered citizens 
who will be professionally active for another third of a century. If the revolution of rising 
expectations now being unleashed by the modernization drive, and changes in China's 
education policies cannot be reasonably fulfilling for most of the nation's youth, the 
"lost generation" will be continually reinforced with significant numbers of disillusioned 
24 W.G. Say well 
young people. This may very well be one of the most explosive problems facing China's 
leadership in the 1980's. 
If, on the one hand, the political leadership and ideological direction of the country 
generally should change sharply, these changes will be reflected quickly and profoundly 
in education which has consistently been one of the areas most sensitive to ideological 
debate and policy change. If, on the other hand, China's drive toward modernization has 
reasonable success and as both cause and effect of that , the type of pragmatic and ideolo-
gically moderate leadership now in control lasts, the changes in China's education policies 
introduced since Mao will have a profound impact on China's overall course in the fore-
seeable future. 
Several features of current policies in education, in particular the key school system 
and the despatch abroad of thousands of students and scholars, cannot help but create 
a new generation of elites, less committed to the essentially egalitarian ethic of the 
earlier Maoist revolution. There could be a striking historical parallel here with the 
first decade of this century, when in a desperate move to retain power by reform, the 
Qing dynasty set up modern schools and sent thousands of Chinese students to study 
abroad, particularly in Japan. These young people became the recruits and leaders of the 
revolutionary forces that then overthrew the dynasty and established a republic. They 
also became the leaders of the Marxist revolution who ultimately led the Chinese 
Communist Party to power. Only Mao Zedong among the very top leaders did not share 
that foreign experience. 
It would be foolhardy to predict that the new educational system, if it continues, will 
produce a generation intent upon overthrowing the basic form of government and society 
China has evolved since 1949. But one would be equally foolish to ignore the probability 
that if current policies continue they could produce a generation insistent that there be 
no return to the kinds of Maoist policies now being jettisoned. That the Chinese already 
recognize this is abundantly clear. That the leadership is at this point either willing or 
capable of doing anything about it, is not . Those interested in the overall political and 
economic course China will follow, should keep their eyes rivetted to the area of educa-
tion. It provides the lithmus test to the true ideological underpinnings beneath the 
political rhetoric in other major policy areas and an extraordinarily sensitive weathervane 
to policy changes in the wind. 
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